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by M A 0  TSE-TUNG 
N e w  Yark NEW CENTURY PUBLISHERS f 948 
PUBWSEER'S NOTE 
rn *I, 
This pamphlet contains the report by Mao Tse-tung on 
the "Present Situation and Our Tasks" to the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China, December 
25, 1947. It is the fifth important document by Mao Tse- 
tung since 1937. The first was On Protracted War (19881, 
an analysis of the nature of China's war against Japan. The 
, second, On a New Stage (19381, discussed the stalemate 
in the war against Japan. The third, China's New Democ- 
racy (19391, @ves the broad outline for the future develop 
ment of China; and the fourth, The Fight for a New China 
(19451, txpiains the: nature of China's prospective d m *  
cratic coalition government. 
The text of this pamphlet is from New China News 
Agency, Hongkong. The captions are the publisher's. 
P*kd NEW C B E I ~ ~ ~ R Y  PUBLISHRRS, 832 Broadway, N. Y. C. 
A M I  1948 -.f PRINTED IN U,S.A. 
1.  OM DEFENSIYIE TO OFFENSIVE 
4 The revolutionary war of the Chinese peopk has now 
reached a turning point. The Chinese People's Liberation 
Army has repeIled the attacks of several million reac- 
tionary troops of Chiang Kai-shek, running dog of Amer- 
imn imperialism, and has itself gone over to the offensive. 
Already during the first year of the war, from July, 1946, 
to June, 1947, the People's Liberation Army had repelled 
Chiang Kai-shek's offensives an several battlefronts, forc- 
ing him over to the defensive. And since the first quarter 
of the second year of war, between July and September, 
1947, the People's Liberation Army has gone over to the 
offensive on a nation-wide scale. It has smashed Chiang 
Kai-shek's counterrevolutionary plan to direct the war 
toward the l iberad areas with the objective of destroying 
them completely. 
Already the war is no longer waged mainly in the fiber- 
ated areas, but in Kuomintang-controlled areas. The main 
forces of the People's Liberation A m y  have already fought 
their way in to Kuomin tangcontrolled areas. The Chinese 
People's Liberation Army in this land of China has re- 
versed the counterrevolutionary wheels of American im- 
perialism and of Chiang Kaishek's gang of brigands onto 
the road to ruin. They have pushed forward their own 
revolutionary wheels along the road to victory. 
This is a turning point in history. It is the turning point 
from growth to extermination in 20 years of the counter- 
revolutionary rule of Chiang Kakhek. It is the turning 
point from growth to extermination in more than 100 
years of the rule of imperialism in China. 
This is a great event. This went is great because it oc- 
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curs in a country of 450 11lil1io11 people. Once it has take11 . 
place, it  will of necessity move toward nationwide victory. 
This event, furthermore, is great because it occurs in the 
eastem part of the world where there is a population 
totalling more than one billion (half of mankind), suf- 
Eering from the oppression of imperialism. 
The turn of the Chinese people's war of liberation from . 
the defensive to the offensive cannot but bring jubilation 
and encouragement to these oppressed nations. At the 
same time, it is also a form of aid to the oppressed peoples . 
now struggling in various countries of Europe and the 
Americas. 
2. CHUNG'S COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY WAR 
From the very day on which Chiang Kai-shek launched 
his counterrevolrltionary war, we said that we not only 
Inust, but could, defeat Chiang Kai-shek. We must defeat 
Chiang Kai-shek because the war launched by him i s  a 
counterrevolutionary war directed by American im pe- 
rialism against the independence of the Chinese' nation 
and the liberation of the Chinese people. 
The tasks of the Chinese people after the condusion of 
World War 11 and the overthrow of Japanese imperialism 
were to effect new demwratic reforms politimlly, as well 
as economically and culturally, to realize the unity and 
independence of the nation, and to change from an agricul- 
tural into an industrial country. But precisely at this 
time, after the victorious conclusion of World War 11, 
American imperialism and its running dogs in various 
countries replaced German and Japanese imperialism and 
their running dogs, and organized a reactionary camp 
against the Soviet Union and the new democratic coun- 
tries .of Europe, against the working-class movement in 
the capitalist countries, against the national movement in 
the colonies and semi-ci)lonies. and against the liberation 
of  the Chinese people. 
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In this situation the Chinese reactionay clique headed 
by Chiang kai-shek bemme the running dog of American 
imperialism just as Weng Ching-wei had previously be- 
come the running dog of Japanese imperialism. They sold 
out China to America, unleashed war, oppmd the 
Chinese people, and obstructed the advance of the cause 
of the people's liberation. Had we at this time displayed 
weakness and yielded, had we not dared resolutely to arise 
to fight the coun terrevolu tionarg war with revolutionary 
war, China would have become a world of darkness, and 
the future of our nation would have been sacrificed. The 
Chinese People's Liberation Army, led by the Chinese 
Communist Party, resolutely engaged in a patriotic, just, 
revolutionary war against the offensives of Chiang Kai- 
shek. Rasing itself on the experience of Marxism-teninism, 
the Chinese Communist Party clearIy estimated the inter- 
national and domestic situation, and knew that all the 
attacks of domestic and foreign reactionaries not only 
must, but could, be defeated. 
When the skies seemed dark we pointed out that this 
was but temporary, that the tempest would soon be over, 
and that the light of dawn was just ahtad. When Chiang 
Kai-shek's gang of brigands launched a nation-wide coun- 
temevolutionarg war in July, 1946, they considered that 
only three to six months were required to defeat the Peo- 
ple's Liberation Army. 
They counted on two million reguIar army trmps, more 
than one rnilIion irregular troops and more than one mil- 
lion personnel and troops of rear-area military organiza- 
tions-a total military strengtb of more than four nlillion 
men. They had already gained time to complete prepam- 
tions for the offensive. They again controlled the big cities; 
they held a population of mare than 300 million; they 
had taken over all equipment of the one million troops 
of the Japanese Army invading Cbina; and they had 
obtained huge military and financial aid horn the United 
States Government. 
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Furthermore, they thought the Chinese People's Libem- 
tion Army had glready fought itself out in the course of 
eight years of the anti-Japanege war, and was far behind 
the Kuomintang army in numbers and equipment. The 
Chinae liberated areas still had only a population of a 
' little over 100 million. The reactionary forces of feudalism 
in most of these areas had not yet been cleaned out. The 
land reform was still not universal and thorough, and the 
rear of the People's Liberation Army not yet consolidated. 
Based on all this, Chiang Kai-shek's gang of brigands, 
heedIess of the Chinese people's yearning for peace, once 
and for all tore up the truce signed by both- the Cornmu- 
nist and Kuomintang parties in January, 1946, and the 
resolutions of the Polit id Consultative Conference of 
various parties and group, and hunched, an adventurous 
war. At that time we said that our enemy's superiority 
in military strength was only temporary, a factor playing 
only a temporary role. The aid of American imperialism 
was likewise a factor playing only a temporary role. 
On the o w r  hand, the anti-popular nature of Chiang 
Kai-shek's war, and the s u p p  or opposition of the peo- 
ple are factors playing a constant role, and in these the 
superiority belongs ~o the People's Liberation Army. The 
struggle of the People's Liberation Army is patriotic, 
just apd revolutionary, which mmt of necessity gain the 
support of the people throughout the country. This is the 
political basis for conquering Chiang fi-shek. The ex- 
perience of 18 months fully bears out our judgment. 
Seventeen months of combat-July, 1946, to November, 
1947, with December not yet included, datroyed a total of 
1,690,000 of Chiang Kai-shek's regular and irregular 
troop, of 'which 640,000 were killed or wounded and 
1,050,000 were taken prisoner. Our troops were thus 
enabled ta repel the offensive of Chiang KaMhek, pre- 
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serve the hasic regions of the liberated areas, and go over 
to the ofEensive. Militarily speaking, we were able to do 
this because we carried out a correct strategic line. Our 
military principles are: 
1. First strike scattered and isolated groups of the 
enemy, and later strike conceri trated, powerful group. 
2. First take small and middle-sized towns and cities 
and the broad countryside, and later take big cities. 
3. The major objective is the annihilation of the enemy 
fighting strength, and not the holding or taking of cities 
and places. The holding or taking of cities and place is 
the result of the annihilation of the enemy's fighting 
strength, which often has to be repeated manya times be- 
fore they mn be finally held or taken. 
4. In every battie, concentrate absolutely superior 
forcts+iouble, triple, quadruple, and sometimes wen five 
or six times chose of the enemy-to encircle the enemy on 
all sides, and strive for his annihilation, with none esmping 
from the net. Under specific conditions, adopt the methcd 
of dealing the enemy smashing blows, that is, the concen- 
tration of all £ o m  to strike the enemy's center and one 
or both of the enemy's flanks, aiming at the datruction of 
a part of the enemy and the routing of another part so that 
our troops m swiftly transfer forces to smash another 
enemy p u p .  Avoid battles of attrition in which gains 
are not sufficient to make up for the losses, or in which the 
gains mere1 y balance the lasses. Thus we are inferior taken 
as a whole--numerimlly speaking-but our absolute super- 
iority in wery section and in wery specific campaign 
guarantees the victory of each mmpaign. As time goes by, 
we will become superior, taken as a whole, until the enemy 
is totally destroyed. 
5. Fight no unprepared engagements; fight no engage- 
ments in which there is no assurance of victory. Strive 
for preparation and assurance of victory in wery engage- 
ment based on the relative conditions of out forces and 
- those of the enemy. 
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6. Promote and exemplify valor in combat; fear no 
sacrifice or fatigue nor continuous actions-that is, fighting 
seqeral engagements in succession within a short period 
without respite. 
7. Strive to destroy the enerny while in movement. At 
the same time, emphasize the tac tiai of attacking positions, 
wresting strong points and bases honi the enemy. 
8. With regard to assaults on cities, resoluteIy wrest 
from the enemy all strong points and cities which are 
weakly defended. At favorable opportunities, wrest all the 
enemy's strong points and cities which are defended to a 
medium deg.ree and where the circumstances permit. Wait 
until conditions hature, and then wrest a11 enemy strong 
points and cities which are powerfuIIy defended. 
9. Replenish ourselves by the capture of all enemy arms 
and most of his personnel. The source of men and materiel 
Eor our army is mainly at the front, 
10. SkillEully utilize the intervals between two cam- 
paigns for resting, regrouping and training troop. The 
period of rest and regrouping should in genehl not be 
too long. As Ear as possible do not let the enemy-have 
breathing space. . 
All the above are the principal methods by which the 
People's Liberation A m y  defeats Chiang Kai-shek. 
These methods were Eorged by the People's Liberation 
Army in the course of proIonged warhre with domestic 
and foreign enemies, and are entirely suitable to our p m -  
ent wnditions. Chiang Kai+hek's gang of brigands and 
the military personnel of American imperialism in China 
are well aware oE our military methods. Chiang Kai-shek 
has many tima mIled together his generals and field of- 
ficers for training, issuing for study our military books - 
and hume.nts obtained in battle, attempting to seek 
counter-measures. 
The Amerim military personnel suggest this and that 
s.trategy and tactic to Chiang Kai4hek for destroying the 
People's Liberation Army, directly train troop for 
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Chiang Kai-shek, and supply him with military equip 
ment. But none of these efforts mn save Chiang Kai-shek's . 
gang of brigands from defeat. This is because our strategy 
and tactia are founded on a peopla' war. No anti-popular 
q y  mn utilize our strategy and tactics. A vital factor 
in conquering the enemy is the establishment of strong 
and powerful revolutionary palitical work by the Peopk's 
Libmation' Army based on a people's war and on the 
solidarity of army and people, the solidarity of com- 
manders and fighters, and the disintegration of thi enemy. 
When we dodged the mortal blows of the superior 
enemy, transferred our military forces to seek the destruc- 
tion of the enemy in movement, and abandoned many 
cities on our own initiative, our enemy was jubilant. They 
considered that this was their victory and our defeat. They 
went dizzy over the so-called successes of a moment. 
On the second day of Kalgan's occupation Chiang Kai- 
s hek ordered the convening of his reactionary National 
Assembly, as if his reactionary rule would henceforth be 
as secure as the Tai Mountain.* The Amerimn im- 
perialists were-also cutting joyous capers, as if their wild 
schemes of converting China into an American koiony 
could henceforth be carried out without hindrance. 
But as time went by, Cfiiang Kai-sh6k and his American 
masters changed their tune. Now all domestic and foreign 
enemies are dominated by pessimistic sentiments, They 
heave great sighs, loudly proclaiming a crisis; and not even 
a trace of joy is to be seen. 
In the course of I8 months, most of Chiang Kai-shek's 
high-ranking frontline commanders have been dismissed 
or r4lam.d because of their military defeats. Among them 
are Chengchow's Liu Chih, Hsuchow's Hsueh Y ueh, north 
Kimgsu's Wu Chi-wei, south Shantung's Tang En-po, 
north Honan's Wang Chung-Lien, Mukden's T u  Yu-ming 
and Hsiung Shih-hui, Peiping's Sun Lien-chung and 
Tabhan is one of China's five famous rnountainr. 
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others. Chiang Kai-shek's Chief of the General St&, Chen 
, Cheng, empowered to direct over-all operations, was also 
deprived of his command and demoted to commander of 
a single battlefront, Manchuria. 
But during the period in which Chiang Kai-shek him- 
self replaed Chen Cheng as &era11 commander, there 
developed the situation in which Chiangis armies passed 
over from the offensive to the defensive and the People's 
Liberation Army passed over from the defensive to the 
offensive. Chiang Kai-sbek's reactionary clique and their 
American masters should now be aware of their own 
mistakes, A11 efforts of the Chinese Communist Party dur- 
ing a long period after the Japanese surrender to assure 
peace and oppose civil war-efEorts that represented the 
yearnings of the Chinese people-they regarded as expres- 
sions of cowardice and feebleness. They overestimated 
their own strength, undera timated revolutionary strength, 
and adventurously unleashed war, and thereby fell into 
the trap they themselves had laid. The strategic calcula- 
tions of the enemy have miscarried completely. 
4, TI333 AGRARIAlYREFORM 
At present, the rear areas of the People's Liberation 
A m y  are much more consolidated than 18 months ago. 
This is because our Party resolutely sided with the peasants 
in reforming the agrarian system. During the anti-Japanese 
war, For the sake of establishing an anti-Japanese united 
front with the Kuomintang and uniting all people who 
at  the time were still capable of resisting Japan, our Party 
on its own initiative changed from the policy before the 
an ti- Japanese war of confiscating landlords' lands and 
distributing them to the peasants to that of reducing rents 
and interest. This was entirely neFessary. 
After the Japanese surrender, the peasants urgently de- 
manded land and we, therefore, made a timely decision 
to change the agrarian policy of reducing rents and in- 
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tereats to one of conhating the lands of the landlord class 
and distributing them to the peasants. The directive issued 
by our Party*s CentraI Committee on May 4, 1946, ex- 
p r e d  this change. h September, 1947, our Party wn- 
vened a National Agrarian Conference, worked out the 
basic program on Chinese agrarian law, and immediately 
carried it wt universally throughout the various areas. 
This step not only affirmed the Ihe. of last year's May 4 
directive, but aIso made dear-cut changes, such as not 
permitting to the landlord more land and properties than 
the peasants, and no longer leaving the land and properties 
of rich peasants untouched in principle. The basic program 
on Chinese agrarian law stipuIates that under the principle 
of eliminating the agrarian system of feudal and semi- 
feudal exploitation and establishing the agrarian system 
of land to the tillers, the land shall be equally distributed 
accmding to population. This is the most thorough 
method of eliminating the feudal system and entirely con- 
forms with the demands of broad masses of the peasants. 
In order resofutefy and thoroughly to carry out the 
agrarian reform, not only peasant unions of the broadat 
character, and their elected committees, comprising the 
great masses of fann laborers, poor peasants and middle 
peasants must be organized in the villages; but also, and 
first of all, poor peasants' leagues, and their elected com- 
mittees, wmprhieg the m e s  of poor peasants and farm 
laborers, must be organized in the villa*. 
These will be the legaI organs for carrying out the 
agrarian reform, and the poor peasants' organization 
should become the backbone of the struggles of all rural 
areas. Our policy is to rely on the poor peasints, to unite 
solidly with the middle peasants to destroy the feudal and 
semi-feudal exploitation system of the landlord class and 
old-type rich peasants. - 
The land and properties distributed to the landlords 
and rich peasants shall not exceed thclse distributed to the 
peasant masses, But neither should the erroneous ultra- 
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left policy carried out between I931 and 1934, the so-called 
"distribute no land to the landlords, and poor land to the 
rich peasants" policy, be repeated. 
The proportion of landlords and rich peasanu ib the 
village ppulation m a y  be greater or smaller in various 
places, but generalIy speaking they make up only approx- 
imately 8 per cent, reckoned in families. However, the Iand 
they hold as a rule makes up 70 to 80 per cent of all land. 
'Thel-efure, our agrarian reform is opposed to a very small 
rlumbw of people, while the number of people (families) 
in the villages who can and should partidpate in the 
agrarian-refom united front make up over 90 per cent. 
T w o  basic principles must be noted here: First, it is 
necessary to satisfy the demands of the poor peasants and 
farm laborers-this is the most basic task of the agrarian 
reform. Second, it is necessary to unite resolutely the 
middle peasants and not injure their interests. We need 
only grasp these two basic principles, and the tasks of our 
agrarian reform will surely triumph completely. 
In accordance with the principle of equal distribution, 
the surplus land and a portion of the propertier of old- 
type rich peasants should be distributed because China's 
rich peasants in general have a heavy feudal and semi- 
feudal exploiting nature. Most rich peasants collect land 
rents and engage in usury, and the conditions of their 
hired labor are semi-feudal. 
Also because the land they hold is very .great in quantity 
and very good in quality, the demands of the poor peasants 
and farm Iaborers cannot be satisfied if equal distribution 
is not carried.out. But, in accordance with the stipulatioa~ 
of the basic program on Chinese agrarian law, in general 
there should be differentiation between the treatment of 
rich peasants and landlords. 
In the course of agrarian reform, the middle peasants 
express approval of equal land distribution be-use it 
does not harm the middle peasants. In equal distribution, 
the land of a portion of d ~ e  middle peasants remains un- 
12 
r.hanged: the land of another portion increases, Only a 
portion of well-to-do middle peasants have a small quantity 
of surplus land, and they are willing to hand it over for 
equal distribution, because thereby their land tax burden, 
is lighter. Nevertheless, in mrrying out equal distribution 
in the various areas, it is still necessary to heed the 
opinions of the middle peasants; if they do not agree, con- 
cessions should be made to them. 
In the c o n k t i o n  and distribution of the land and 
properties of the feudal classes, attention should be paid 
to the needs of certain middle peasants. !n the demarca- 
tion of rural class composition, are must be taken not to 
assign those who are really middle peasants erroneudy 
to the rich peasant mtegory. Active elements among the 
middle peasants mwt be absorbed into Peasant Union 
Committees and the government and their work. With re- 
gard to the burdens of land taxation and support of the 
war, just and equitable principles shouId + adopted. All 
these are the concrete policies that must be adopted by 
our Party in carrying out the strategic task of solidly unit- 
ing the middle peasants. 
The entire Party must understand that the thorough 
reform of the agrarian system is the basic task of the 
present stage of the Chinese revotution. If we can uni- 
versally and thoroughly solve the agrarian question, we 
will have obtained the most basic condition required for 
conquering all enemies. 
5. REORGANIZATION OF THE PARTY 
To carry out resolutely and thoroughly the agrarian 
reform and consolidate the rear amas of the People's 
Liberation Army, it is necessary to reorganize and survey 
the ranks of the Party. The movement for the rebmation 
of ideology and of style of work within our-Party during 
the period of the anti-Japanese war in general attained 
gucceq, This success lay, in the main. in that our leading 
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organs and many cadres were able to advance a step further 
in their grasp of such a basic orientation as the integration 
of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the con- 
crete practice of the Chinese revolution. In this respect, 
our Party has taken a great stride forward in comparison 
with the several historical periods prior to the anti- 
Japanese war. . 
However, the question of the impure composition and 
the working style of the Party's 1-1 organizations, and 
mpeciaUy of the Party's primary rulfal organizations, was 
not solved During t&e 1 1 years Erom 1937 to 1947, our 
Party organization developed from sevetal tens of thou- 
sands of Party members to 2,700,000. This is a huge leap 
fomrd. It has made our Party an unprecedentedly strong 
Party. It provided us with the possibiIities of defeating 
- Japanese imperialism and repelling the offensive of 
Chimg Kai-shek, and leading the liberated areas of more 
than 100 million population and a People's Liberation 
Army two million strong. 
. But along with this also came defects. Many landlords, 
rich peasants and scoundrctls took this oiportunity to slip 
into our Party. They dominate many Party, pvehment 
and mass organizations in the rural areas; lord it over, 
bully and oppress the people; and distort the Party's 
policies, causing these organizations to become alienated 
horn the masses of the people and preventing the agrarian 
reform from being carried through. Such serious mndi- 
tions place before us the task of reorganizing and puriEj- 
ing the ranks of the Party. If this task is not solved we 
cannot make progress in the rural areas. 
The Party's National Agrarian Conference thoroughly 
discussed this question, and stipulated appropriate steps 
and methods. .These steps and methods are now being 
resoIuteIy carried out in the various areas in connection 
with the equal distribution of land. 
Among them, the first in importance is the unfolding 
of criticism and self-criticism within the Party, thoroughly 
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r to expose erroneous thinking and serious deviations from the Party's line in the omizat ions  of various areas. All 
Party comradeg must realize that the solution of this ques- 
tion, reorganizing and purifying the ranks of the Party, 
enabling the Party to travel in the same direction with the 
broadat laboring masses and lead them forward, is a 
decisive link in solving the agrarian question and support- 
ing the prolonged warfare. 
I 6. ECQNOMIC STRUCTURE OF NEW €ElNA 
Confismte the land of the feudal dassa and p u ~ i t  under 
the ownership of the peasants; confiscate the monopoly 
capital headed by Chiang Kaikhek, T. V. Soong, H. H. 
Kung, and Chen Id-fu and put it under the ownership of 
the new democratic state; protect national industry and 
commerce--these are the three great economic planks of 
the new democratic revolution. 
The four families--Chiang, Soong, Kung and Chen- 
during their twenty pars in power, have amassed 
enonn0.w capital worth 10 to 20 billion American dollars, 
and monopolized the economic pulse of the entire country. 
This monopoly capital, merged with state power, bz- 
wmes state-monopoly capital. This monopoly capitalism. 
intimately merged with foreign imperialism and the 
dommtic landlord class' and pld-style rich peasants, be- 
comes compradore-feudal, state-monopoly capitalism. This 
is the economic foundation of Chiang Kai-shek's reac- 
tionary regime. This state-monopoly capitalism not only 
oppresses workers and peasants, but also oppresses the petty 
bourgeoisie and injures the middle bourgeoisie. This 
state-monopol y capitalism reached its highest peak during 
the anti-Japanese war and after the Japanese surrender. 
It prepared the full material conditions for the new demo- 
cratic revolution. 
This capital is popularly called bureaucratic capital in 
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China. This bourgeoisie is called the bureaucratic bour- 
geoisie; it is China's big bourgeoisie. 
Apart from doing away with the special privileges of 
imperialism in China, the object of the new democratic 
revolution within the country is to eliminate exploitation 
and oppression by the landlord class and the bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie (the big bourgeoisie), transform compradore- 
feudal relations of production, and liberate all the impris- 
oned productive forces. The petty bourgeoisie and middle 
bourgeoisie, oppressed and injured by these classes and 
their state power, although they too are bourgeois, may 
however .participate in the new democratic revolution or 
maintain neutrality. 
They have no or compa>atively few connections wit11 
imperialism; they are the real national bourgeoisie. Wher- 
ever the state power of new democracy extends, these 
classes must be firmly and unhesitatingly protected. Among 
the upper petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie in the 
areas ruled by Chiang Kai-shek, there is a portion, small 
in number, with reactionary political tendencies, the right- 
ist elements of these classes. They disseminate i!lasions 
about American imperialism and C h h g  Kai-shek'a reac- 
tionary bloc and oppose the  people"^ democratic revolution. 
As long as their reactionary tendencies can still influ- 
ence the masses, we should carry on work of exposure 
among the masses under tpeir influence-strike at their 
political influence in order to liberate the masses from it. 
But political blows are one thing, and economic extermi- 
nation is another. If we confuse these two things, we will 
commit mistakes. 
The new democratic revolution is to eliminate only 
feudalism and monopoly capitalism, only h e  landIord 
class and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (big bourgeoisie)- 
not capitaIism in general and not the petty and the middle 
bourgeoisie. Owing to the backwardnas of China's econ- 
omy it will still be necessary to permit the existence, for 
a long period, of the capitalist economy represented by the 
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broad petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie even 
after the nation-wide victory of the revolution. 
Furthermore, in accordance with the division of labor 
in the national economy, the development of all sections 
-among them beneficial to the national economy will still 
be n e c e s q ;  they will still be an indispensable part of the 
entire national economy. 
The petty bourgeoisie includes small-scale industrial 
and commercial capitalists who hire workers and em- 
ployees. But besides these, there are the broad, independ- 
ent, small industrial and commercial businessmen who do 
not hire workers or employees. With regard to these small 
industrial and commercial businessmen, it goes without 
saying that they should be firmly protected. After the 
nation-wide victory of the revolution, the new democratic 
state will have in its hands enprmous state capital which 
controls the economic p u k  of the entire country, taken 
over from the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. It will also have 
'the agricul turd emnomy emancipated from the feudal 
system. Although for quite a long time the agricultural 
economy will still be basically smttered and individual, it  
can be guided step by step in the direction of mperatives 
in the future. Under these conditions the existence and 
development of small and middle capitalist elements are 
not at all dangerous. 
The same applies to the new rich peasant economy 
which will necessarily come into being in the rt~raLareas 
after the agrarian revolution. 
Adopting ultra-Left, erroneous policies toward the petty 
bourgeois and middle bourgeois economic elements as our 
Party did in the period from 1931 to 1984 must absolutely 
not be permitted to recur. Such policies were: excessively 
high working conditions, excessively high income tax rates; 
inhinging on industrial and commercial elements in the 
agrarian reform; not taking as our objectives the develop- 
ment of production and a flourishing economy; not taking 
'into account both public and private interests and benefits 
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to both tabor and capital, but taking as our objectives 
shortLsighted, unilateral, so-called "welfare of the toilers" 
policy. If thiar kind of mistake is repeated, it will nwegsarily 
injure the interests of the laboring masses and of the new 
democratic state. 
There is a provision in the basic program on Chinese 
agrarian law: "The property and le@ operation of indus- 
trial and commercial small business shall be protected 
Erom infringement." T h e  industrial and +commercial busi- 
nessmen mentioned here include all independent, small 
i~ldustrial and commercial businessmen, and a l  small and 
middle capitalist elements. 
T o  sum up, the economic structure of new China is: 
1. State economy-this is the leading element; 
2. An agricultural economy developing step by step 
from individual toward collective fanning; 
3. The economy of independent, small industrial and 
commercial businessmen and the economy of small and 
middle private capital. 
These are the entire national economy oE the new 
democracy. 
The guiding principle of the national economy of the 
new democracy must closely pursue the general objective 
of developing production and a flourishing econofiy, 
taking into account both public and private intmts and 
benefits to both labor and capital. All pfhbples, policies 
and "methods which deviate from this general objective 
are eerroneous. 
7. NATIONAL UNITED FRONT 
The People's Liberation Army issued a maaifesto in 
October, 1947, in which it was stated: "Unite the workers, 
peasants, soldiers, students, and commercial elements, a1 l 
opprased classes, a 1  people's organizations, all &-tic 
parties and groups, all national minorities, overseas Chi- 
nese everywhere and other patriotic elements-unite t~ 
organize a national united front to strike down the dicta- 
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torial government of Chiang Kai-shek and establish a 
democratic coalition government ." 
This is the most basic political platform of the People's 
Gberation Army as well as of the Chinese Communist 
Party. Regarded superiicially, our revolutionary national 
united front in the present period appears to have shrunk 
as compared with the period of the anti-Japanese wart But 
in reality it is only in the present period, it b only after 
Chiang Kai-shek sold out the national interests to Arneri- 
a n  imperialism and launched an anti-popular nation-wide 
internal war, and it is only after the crimes of American 
imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary ruling blot: 
had been completely exposed before the Chinese people 
chat our nationaI united front really broadened. 
During the anti-Japanese war, Chiang Kai-shek and the 
Kuomintang had noPcompleteIy lost prestige among the 
Chinese people, they still had many daxptive functions. 
It is different now: all their deceptions have been laid bare 
by their own deeds. They have no masses whatsoever, and 
they are already compIetely isolated. As opposed to the 
Kuomintang, the Chinese Communist Party has not only 
obtained the confidence of the broadest masses of the 
people in the liberated areas, but has also obtained the 
support of the broad masses of the people in the Kuomin- 
tangcontrolled areas and big cities. If in 1946 there was 
still a section of people among the intelligentsia of the 
upper petty and middIe bo~rgeoisie under Chiang Kai- 
shek's rule who still cherished the idea of a so-called "third 
road," tbese ideas have now become bankrupt. 
Owing to our Party's adoption of a thorough agrarian 
policy, it is able to obtain the loyal support of the masses 
of peasants much broader than during the anti-Japanese - war. Owing to the aggression of American imperialism, the 
oppression of Chiang gai-shek, and our Party's correct 
line of resolutely protecting the interests of the masses, 
our Party has obtained the sympathy of the broad masges 
of the working class, peasant classes, petty bourgeoisie and 
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middle bourgeoisie in the areas under Chiang Kai-sl~ek's 
rule. These masses unceasingly raise high the struggle 
against American imperialism and Chiang Kaiahek's reac- 
tionary government bemuse they suffer from hunger, 
because they are politicaily oppressed, and because Cl~iang 
Kaiahek's anti-popular civil war has snatched away all of 
the tjeople's means of life. 
Their basic slogans are against hunger, against oppres- 
sion, against civil war, and against American intervention 
in China's dommtic affairs. Before and during the anti- 
Japanese war and for a period after the Japanese surrender, 
opposition to such an extent was never reached. Therefore, 
we say that our new democratic revolutionary united front 
is now broader and also more consolidated than at any. 
per id  in the past. 
This arises not only from our a&rian and urban poli- 
cim, but is moreover closely connected with the general 
political situation arising horn the victories of the People's 
Liberation Army, Chiang Kai-shek's ping over Erom the 
offensive to the defensive, the People's Liberation Army's 
going over from the defensive to the offensive, and the 
entering of the Chinese revoIution into a new period of 
upsurge. The peopIe have now seen that the extinction of 
Chiang Kai-shek's rule is already inevitable, and they there- 
fore place their hopes on the Chinese Communist Party 
and the People's Liberation Army. This is only natural. 
Without the broadest united front comprising the over- 
whelming majority of the entire national population, the 
victory of the Chinese New Democratic Revolution is 
impossible. But this is not all, this united front must also 
be under the firm leadorship of the Chinese Communist 
Party. Without the firm leadership of the Chinese Commu- 
nist Party, no revolutionary united front can be victorious. 
In 1927, when the war of the Northern Expedition 
reached its hei ht, the capitulators in our Party's leading 
organs volunta $ ly abandoned leadelship of the masses of 
peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and,middle bourgeoisie, and 
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cspxiall y abandoned leadership over the armed forces, 
musing the revolution of that time to meet with defeat. 
During the anti-Japanese war, our Party o p p e d  a 
way of- thinking that approached capitulation, that is, 
yielding to the Kuomintang's and-popular policies, trust- 
ing the Kuomintang niore than the masses, not daring to 
give free rein to the mass struggle, not daring to enlarge 
the liberated areas and the people's armies in the Japanese- 
occupied areas, and presenting the leademhip of the anti- 
Japanese war to the Kuomintang. Our Party carried on 
a resolute struggle against this kind of feeble, incompetent 
and decadent thinking which violated the principla of 
Marxism-leainism. Our Party resolutely carried out the 
pol it iml line of "developing progressive forces, winning 
over middle-of-the-road forces, and isolating die-hard 
forces," and resolutely enlarged the liberated areas and 
the People's Liberation Army. 
This policy not only guaranteed that our Party could 
conquer Japanese imperialism during the period of Japa- 
nese imperialist aggression, but it also guaranteed that o t~r  
Party without losses could shift smoothly to the pat11 OF 
opposing Chmng hi-shek's countemevolutionary war wi ttl 
a people's revolutionary war when Chiang Kai-shek waged 
r:ounterrevolutionary war after the Japanese surrender. 
And within a short period we had great victories. All Party 
comrades must bear that historic lesson well in mind. 
8. TRE LIGHT OF DAWN 
In 1946, when Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary blur 
launched its nation-wide, anti-popular, internal war. it 
dared to be adventurous not only because it relied on its 
own superior military strength, but pricinpally because i t  
relied on American imperialism, which it believed to be 
extraordinarily powerhl and matcliiess throughout the 
world, holding the atomic bomb in its hands. On the one 
h,~nd. they believed chat American imperialism could 
s ~ ~ , + ~ * o i  them with a steady scream of military and financial 
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aid, and on the other hand, they wildly imagined the-so- 
mlled "necessity of war between the United States and the 
Soviet Union" and the so-called "necessity of the outbreak 
of a third wwld war." 
Such reliance on American imperialism is a common 
characteristic of the reactionary £0- in the various coun- 
tries throughout the world after World War 11. This fact 
reflects the seriousness of the blow dealt to world capital- 
ism by Wqrld War 11, the feebleness of the reactionary 
forces in the various countries and their psychologial 
panic and loss of confidence. It reflects the powerful might 
of the revolutionary forces of the whole world which causes 
the reactionaries of various countries to feel them is no 
way out except to rely on the aid of U.S. imperialism. 
But, in real'ity, is American imperialism after World 
War 11 as powerful as Chiang Kai-shek and the reaction- 
aries of the various countries imagine? Can it really pour 
a steady stream from America to succor Chiang Kai-shek 
and the reactionaries of the various countries? Not in the 
least. The economic strength of Americaa imperialism, 
which grew during World War 11, is confronted with an 
unstable and a steadily shrinking domestic and inter- 
national market. Further shrinking of this market will 
lead to the outbreak of an economic crisis. 
Amerian war prosperity is merely a momentary phe- 
nomenon. Its strength is only superficial and ternpomry. 
A crisis, like a voImno, is daily menacing American i m p  
realism; it is sitting right on this volcano. 
This situation forced American imperialist elements to 
establish a p h  for enslaving the world, to plunge like 
a wild beast into Europe, Asia, and other places, muster 
the reactionary forces of various countries--&= dregs 
spat out by the people-to organize the imperialist anti- 
democratic front against all democratic forces headed by 
the Soviet Union, prepare war, scheming at some m o t e  
day in the future to unleash World War I11 and defeat 
the democratic h. 
1 
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This is a wild p h .  The democratic forces of the whole 
world must, and an, completely defeat this plan. The 
strength of the world anti-imperiaiisist o m p  exceeds that 
d the imperiallt amp. The superiority is with us, not 
with the enemy, The anti-imperialist camp headed by the 
Soviet Union has Jready been formed. 
With no crises, steadily growing, and cherished by the 
broad masses of the people of the whole world, the strength 
of the S&list Soviet Union now already exceeds that of 
imperialist Merica,  which is seriously menaced by crisis, 
which is declining, and is opposed by the broad masses 
of the people of the whole world. 
, The various new democratic countries of Europe are 
consolidating themselves internally and uniting with one 
another. The anti-imperialist Eorces of the people of vari- 
ous European mpitalist countries, especially in France and 
Italy, are growing. Within the United States the people's 
democratic forces are daily growing stronger. 
The peoples of Latm Amerim are not at all slaves sub- 
servient to America. A mighty national liberation move- 
ment has arisen throughout all Asia. All forces of the anti- 
imperialist camp are uniting and developing. 
The Communist parties of nine European countries 
have organized an information bureau and published a 
summons to battle, alling on the people of the whole 
world to arise in opposition to the imperialist plans of 
enslavement. 
This summons to battle has inspired the oppressed peo- 
ples of the whole world, pointed out to them the direction 
of struggle, and consolidated their coddence in victory. 
Confronted with this summons to battle, the reactionaries 
of the whole world are in confusion and consternation. 
All anti-imperialist force of the various Eastern mun- 
tries should also unite to oppose the oppression of impe 
rialism and the reactionaries within each country, taking 
as the objective of their struggle the liberation of the mom 
than -a billion oppmsd people of ihe East. 
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We should hold our destinies completely in our own 
hands. W e  should clear away all weak and incompetent 
thinking within our ranks. AIL viewpoints which over- 
estimate the strength of the enemy and underestimate the 
strength of the people are erroneous. Together with the 
democratic forces of the whole world, we need only to exert 
our efforts, and we can surely defeat the imperialist plans 
for enslavement, block a third world war so that it cannot 
take place, overthrow the oppression of all reactionaries, 
and win the victory of eternal peace for mankind. 
We are soberly aware of the fact that there wiI1 still be 
all kinds of obstructions and difficulties in our path of 
advance. We should prepare to cope with the greatest 
degree &£ resistance and struggle on the part of all foreign . 
and domestic enemies. Only if we are able to grasp the 
science of Marxism-Leninism, have faith in the masses, 
stand closely together with the rnases and lead them for- 
ward, will we be entirely capable of surmounting any 
obstacle and conquering any difficulty, and our strength 
will be matchless. This is the historic era in which capital: 
ism and imperialism of the whole world are moving ta- 
ward their doom, in which Socialism and democracy of 
the whole world are moving toward victory. The light of 
dawn is just before us. We should put forth our efforts. 
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